Introduction
Over the past two decades, union membership in Australia has fallen from approximately half of the workforce to a quarter of the workforce. Yet unions still retain an important place in Australian politics. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), to which most Australian unions are affiliated, is one of the major lobby groups in Australian politics. One of the major parties in Australian politics, the Australian Labor Party (ALP), is heavily dominated by the union movement.
Yet while much attention has been paid to the role of unions in Australian politics, little attention has been directed to the voting behaviour of union members. Understanding more about unionists' voting patterns can provide us with a fuller picture of how unions operate, and the extent to which the political preferences of union leaders differ from those of their members.
By estimating voting patterns over 11 elections, this paper provides an insight on how the voting patterns of unionists have changed over nearly 40 years. Using such a large sample makes it possible to separately analyse voting patterns of men and women, as well as to explore the factors that lead some unionists to vote for the Coalition. To take account of the possible endogeneity of union membership with respect to voting, two instrumental variable strategies are employed.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the existing literature and provides some background on union membership in Australia. The third section presents empirical results, and the final section concludes.
Background
Closely allied with the union movement since its formation in 1891, unions retain a strong role within the ALP.
1 Those unions that are affiliated to the ALP have a formal role in the party's decision-making process, and control 50% of the votes at the party's federal conference. Of Labor's 88 federal politicians in the 41st parliament, 30 were former party and union officials (Grattan 2005) . In 2003 -04, the union movement donated $7 m to the Labor Party, around 15% of its total fundraising over this period (AEC 2005; AAP 2005) , while the Coalition parties received no donations from unions. 2 In having close ties to the Australian union movement, the ALP is similar to Continental European social democratic parties, which cooperate closely with the national trade union movements in their respective countries. 3 Yet some have argued that the close ties between the union movement and the ALP have frayed over recent decades. Jaensch (1989) argues that the 1950s Labor Party 'was labourist . . . essentially protective of labour and labour's interests', but that the relationship changed with the prices and wages accord in the 1980s. While the organisational ties between federal Labor and the ACTU were strong during this period, there is a view that unions at this time came to be treated by Labor more as a pressure group than an integral part of the organisation (Phillimore 2000; Briggs 2002; Svensen 2002, cited in Griffin, Nyland and O'Rourke 2004) .
One issue upon which the union movement and the Labor Party have historically differed is trade. Three of Australia's largest tariff cuts-in 1973, 1988 and 1991- were implemented by federal Labor governments, and all were strongly opposed by the union movement at the time (Leigh 2002) . The ALP has also recently resisted a push by the union movement to include labour standards in trade agreements (Griffin, Nyland and O'Rourke 2004) . Another point of difference between the party and sections of the union movement has been environmental policy. In the final week of the 2004 election campaign, Coalition Prime Minister John Howard was cheered by a crowd of Tasmanian timber workers-many of them members of the Construction, The origins of the Labor Party were in New South Wales, where the party was formed as the Labor Electoral League by the NSW Trades and Labour Council (McMullin 1991, 11) . However, as McMullin notes, 'In Labor's early years in NSW, protectionists, free traders, single taxers and socialists jostled for control of the party, and the same kind of process occurred, with significant variations, in each colony ' (1991, 43) . The Website <www.democracy4sale.org>, operated by the NSW Greens, tabulates AEC data on donations into donor categories. Over the period 1998-2004, only one union gave to the federal branch of either the Liberal Party or the National Party: a $4000 donation by the Police Federation to the federal National Party in 2002 -03. The other non-Labor parties to benefit from union donations were the Australian Democrats and the Greens, who received five-figure donations in various years from the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union and the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union.
Forestry, Mining and Energy Union-as he announced a package that would ensure no job losses in their industry.
Another factor that might have affected the voting behaviour of union members is the decline in union membership that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. Figure 1 shows union membership over the period from 1966 from to 2004 from . Between 1966 from and 1986 , union membership fluctuated between 45% and 52% of the workforce, before collapsing during the late 1980s and 1990s. In 2004, just 23% of the Australian workforce were members of a trade union.
As a check on the election surveys used in this paper, I also calculate for each survey the fraction of employees who are union members. These figures are shown with black squares in Figure 1 , and correspond reasonably well with the official data.
At the same time as union membership has collapsed, there is also some suggestive evidence that the proportion of union members whose unions are affiliated to the Labor Party has fallen over time. While data on the fraction of unionists belonging to affiliated unions are scant, Rawson has estimated that about 60% of unionists belonged to ALP-affiliated unions in the mid-1980s, and the figure was 'considerably higher' in earlier decades (Rawson 1986, quoted in Griffin, Nyland and O'Rourke 2004) .
Only a few Australian studies have estimated the relationship between union membership and voting. Using data from the 1993 and 1996 election studies, Charnock (1997b) estimated the effect of union membership (in a regression including 32 Figure 1 . Share of employees in a union (1966 -2004) . Note: union membership rates from 1976 onwards are derived from employee surveys-generally regarded as the most accurate source. For earlier years, we only have estimates from union surveys. These are invariably higher, since they include people who belong to multiple unions, and those who are no longer financial members. In 1976, the estimate in the employee surveys was 7.8% higher than the estimate in the union surveys. To make the two series comparable, I therefore scale down the union survey number for 1911-75 by 7.8%. Source: ABS 6323.0, 6325.0, 6310.0. Black squares represent union membership as a share of the workforce, estimated from election surveys. Since employment status was not asked of all respondents in the surveys that followed the 1966 and 1969 elections, the estimates for these years are not shown.
other demographic and behavioural variables), and found that union members were 18-19% more likely to vote for the ALP. Manning (2006) found similar voting patterns among unionists in the 1987 and 2004 elections. Leithner (1997) explored the interaction between union membership and gender in the 1993 election, and found a gender voting gap only among unionists. Leigh (2005) observed the same pattern in 10 elections over the period 1966 -2001, but urged caution on placing a causal interpretation on the finding, on the basis that union membership is not necessarily exogenous to partisan preference.
What is known about the voting behaviour of union members in other countries? In the United States, Freeman (2003) found that union members (and those in a union household) were 9 -16% more likely to vote Democratic in house and presidential elections. 4 Adding additional covariates to the model had little impact on the marginal effect of union membership. Comparing voting behaviour in Australia, Britain and Canada, Bélanger (2003) found that the marginal effect of being a union member was larger in Australia than the other two countries. Other studies to have analysed the relationship between voting behaviour and union membership include Juravich and Shergold (1988) ; Uhlaner (1989) ; Delaney, Masters and Schwochau (1990) ; Crewe, Fox and Day (1995) ; Clark and Masters (2001); and Citrin, Schickler and Sides (2003) . Without exception, these studies assume that union membership is exogenous with respect to voting behaviour-in other words, that union membership affects political preferences, rather than the other way around. I return to this issue below.
Empirical Results
In analysing voting behaviour and union membership, I use 11 post-election surveys for elections held between 1966 and 2004. Two of these surveys-1987 and 1990-do not contain information on income, and are hence excluded from the multiple regression analysis. In most years, the union membership question was of the type, 'Are you a member of a trade union?', but in 1990 and 1993, the question also allowed respondents to select the option 'staff association'. I code those in staff associations as non-union members (see the Data Appendix for details).
I code respondents as 1 if they said that they voted for the Labor Party, and 0 if they voted for the Liberal-National Coalition. Respondents who said that they cast a first preference vote for any other party are coded as missing. Because the Australian electoral system allows for preferential voting, one would ideally like to take account of the second preferences of those who did not vote first for one of the major parties, but this question was unfortunately not asked in the earlier election surveys. To compensate for this, I present results based on first preference votes in the regression analyses, but show two-party preferred vote results (where available) in the charts.
More information on the surveys and particular variables is set out in the Data Appendix. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1 .
The fraction of the sample who are members of a trade union is depicted in Figure 2 . Across all surveys, an average of 28% of voters are members of a trade union. Note that Figure The voting patterns of trade unionists are depicted in Figure 3 . Across the 11 elections, 63% of union members voted for the Labor Party. In instances where the survey also recorded both the two-party preferred vote, the fraction supporting the Labor Party is very similar (note that the primary vote analysis includes only those who voted for either Labor or the Coalition). 5 In the aggregate data, there is little evidence of any strong time trend in the voting patterns of trade union members.
However, when the data are broken down by gender, a more nuanced pattern emerges. Figures 4 and 5 show the fraction of union members voting Labor in the various elections. Over the entire period, 57% of female union members voted Labor, while 67% of male union members did so. However, in recent years these two groups appear to have converged. Indeed, the 2004 election saw a larger fraction of female unionists vote Labor (61%), than male unionists (57%).
I now turn to a multiple regression analysis, estimating the relationship between union membership and voting Labor across nine elections (1987 and 1990 are excluded since respondents in these years were not asked their income). Column (1) of Table 2 shows the relationship between union membership and voting Labor, with only election fixed effects. Union members are 23% more likely to vote Labor. In column (2) I add a vector of plausibly exogenous demographic controls-five age dummies, five income quintiles, four education categories, whether the respondent was born overseas, gender and marital status-and find that this makes no substantial difference to the union membership coefficient (indeed, the union membership coefficient is slightly larger). Similar results obtain if the sample is restricted to the 2004 election (columns (3) and (4)). Table 3 restricts the sample to union members only, and explores the effect of demographic characteristics on the voting decision of unionists. From the pooled sample (column (1)), it appears that those union members who are more likely to vote Labor are those who are male, middle aged, have lower household incomes, and are less educated. Restricting the sample to 2004 only (column (2)), most of these effects become statistically insignificant, owing to the much smaller sample size. The only effect that remains significant in 2004 is the propensity of more affluent union members to vote for the Coalition.
Up to this point, I have estimated the association between union membership and voting. However, there is no a priori reason to interpret this association in a causal fashion. It is possible that one's political preferences affect union membership, or that both are affected by some third factor. To illustrate this point, one need only look to a parallel literature-estimating factors affecting the decision to join a union, where some studies have estimated the impact that having a Left-wing political orientation has on one's decision to join a union.
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The problem of identifying causation is not unique to the question of union membership and voting. Indeed, it will arise in any instance where researchers are estimating the relationship between two attitudinal values. For example, researchers have tested whether Australians' voting patterns are affected by self-identified class (McAllister 1992; Goot 1994; Charnock 1997a) , post-materialist values (Gow 1990; Western and Tranter 2001) and attitudes to leadership (Marks 1993) .
Such studies typically assumed that the presence of an association between voting and class/values/attitudes indicates that class/values/attitudes have a causal effect In the Australian context see, for example, Peetz (1998, 56 -64) . But as Riley (1997, 277) points out in her review of the British literature on the factors that affect union membership: 'An employee's ideological convictions are frequently surveyed as researchers suspect that ideological convictions function as a direct motivator of the joining decision. However, the causal relationships between these independent variables have not been established.' on the voting decision. But, of course, correlation does not prove causation. Indeed, it is perfectly plausible that the causal relationship operates in the opposite directionthat a person's political inclination is what determines their self-identified class, attitude to post-materialist values or beliefs about leadership. Alternatively, it might be the case that voting and attitudes are determined jointly by some other third factor that is not observable to the statistician. One way to address this endogeneity problem is to include in the regression only variables that are plausibly exogenous to the voting decision. Covariates such as gender, age, education and income are unlikely to be determined by one's political preferences, and hence an association between these variables and partisan preferences can usually be assumed to be causal. While this has the virtue of simplicity, it has the disadvantage of severely restricting the variables that can be included in a voting equation.
Another approach, particularly useful in the case where the independent variable is not plausibly exogenous, is to use an instrumental variable. A good instrument must meet two criteria: it must be correlated with the independent variable of interest (in this case, union membership), and it must be uncorrelated with the dependent variable (in this case, voting behaviour), except through its effect on union membership.
Here, I use two instruments to estimate the causal effect of union membership on voting. The first instrument is whether union membership is compulsory in the respondent's workplace. The assumption underlying this instrument is that an individual's decision to join a workplace where union membership is compulsory is not a function of their ideology, but rather their aptitude and the expected returns from employment in that occupation. Thus working for a company where union membership is compulsory should only affect voting behaviour through the channel of union membership.
The second instrument is the unionisation rate in the respondent's occupation. Again, the assumption underlying this instrument is that occupational choice is not driven by the unionisation rate in a given occupation, but by the person's ability. However, the decision to work in a more heavily unionised occupation will increase the probability that the person will join a union.
Since I am still instrumenting with a choice variable, neither of these instruments will be perfectly exogenous with respect to the voting decision. However, both have the advantage that occupational choice is plausibly more exogenous to voting behaviour than the decision to join a union. The first instrumental variable (IV) strategy is implemented using surveys covering the 1966, 1969 and 1977 elections. Subsequent election surveys did not ask respondents whether union membership was compulsory in their workplace, probably because compulsory unionisation had largely disappeared by the early 1990s (see Peetz 1998, 87-103) . The second uses the 1998, 2001 and 2004 election surveys, which had a common occupational coding system. Unionisation rates in each occupation are estimated using the 1998 election survey, and are then used to instrument for union membership in the 2001 and 2004 surveys. To ensure sufficient sample size in each cell, I use broad occupation codes and drop occupations with fewer than five respondents. This leaves 36 occupations for which unionisation rates can be estimated. Unionisation rates in these 36 occupations range from zero to 59%, with a mean of 27%. Table 4 shows the results of these two specifications. For simplicity, I use a linear probability model. In both cases, I therefore first show the OLS estimates, to confirm that the coefficient on the union membership dummy is not noticeably different from the probit models. In column (1) the union membership coefficient is 0.219 (the probit marginal effect for these elections is 0.227), while in column (3) the union membership coefficient is 0.215 (the corresponding probit marginal effect is 0.223).
In both IV strategies, the first-stage regressions are highly statistically significant, and the partial R 2 values of the excluded instruments are sufficiently large that neither 
Notes:
Ã , ÃÃ and ÃÃÃ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are bracketed. Excluded categories are as follows: age-those aged 18 -29; incomefirst quintile; education-high school dropouts. Instrument in column (2) is whether union membership is compulsory in the respondent's workplace. Instrument in column (4) is the mean unionisation rate in the respondent's occupation (as calculated from the 1998 election survey). appear to suffer from the so-called 'weak instruments' problem (Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995) . Using compulsory unionisation as an instrument, the coefficient is almost precisely the same as in the IV specification, suggesting that the marginal effect on the voting behaviour of those forced to join a union is the same as the average union effect. Using mean unionisation rates, the coefficient on union membership is considerably higher than in the OLS specification, suggesting that the marginal effect on voting behaviour of joining a highly unionised occupation is larger than the average effect of unionisation on voting. One plausible interpretation of this is that having more unionised co-workers might have a direct effect on one's voting decision. If so, this would suggest that compulsory unionisation laws are a better instrument than unionisation rates, and indicate that the results in column (2) should be preferred over those in column (4).
Conclusion
This paper uses 11 post-election surveys covering elections from 1966 to 2004 to estimate the effect of union membership on voting behaviour. I find that around two-thirds of union members vote Labor, and around one-third vote for the Coalition. In probit regressions, union membership increases the chance that the respondent will vote Labor by around 23%. In comparative terms this is a large effect: approximately twice the magnitude of the effect found by Freeman (2003) for the United States.
The union voting effect does not appear to have changed significantly over time, nor does the effect of union membership change when controls are added for age, education, household income, marital status and whether the respondent was born overseas. The marginal effect of union membership was larger for men in the earlier surveys, but in the 2004 election survey the union effect appears to be larger for women. Among unionists, I investigate the factors that distinguish the two-thirds who vote Labor from the one-third who vote for the Coalition. Union members who are male, middle aged, have lower household incomes, and are less educated are more likely to vote Labor than other unionists.
To estimate the causal effect of union membership, two IV strategies are employed-using compulsory union laws and average unionisation rates across occupations to identify the impact of unionisation. The intuition behind the choice of instruments is that occupational choice is more plausibly exogenous with respect to political ideology than the decision to join a union. The results of both IV strategies suggest that the marginal effect estimated from a probit model is not upwardly biased.
Given the foregoing results, it is possible to see what the voting patterns in recent elections would look like if the unionisation rate had remained at 50% of the workforce, its approximate level in the period 1973-82. To calculate this, I multiply the point estimate of the effect of union membership on the Labor vote (þ23%) by the change in the unionisation rate as a fraction of employees, by the share of voters who are employees.
9 These calculations are set out below:
Income Except in 1984, income was divided into bands. There were 8 income categories in 1966, 1969, and 1977; 14 in 1993 and 1996; and 16 in 1998, 2001 and 2004 . Respondents in each range were coded as having family income at the midpoint of the range, or 1.15 times the upper limit in the case of those in the top category. Lastly, it should be noted that, as a consequence of this categorisation and the underlying distribution of incomes, no respondents in 1966 fell into the third income quintile.
Age
The voting age in Australia was 21 until 1973, when it was lowered to 18. In most cases, the survey was restricted to those who were eligible to vote, but in the few cases where respondents reported an age that would have made them ineligible to cast a ballot, they were dropped from the sample.
Trade union membership
The trade union membership question was worded almost precisely the same in all surveys except 1990 and 1993. In these two years, the question allowed the respondent to select either 'trade union' or 'staff association'. In Leigh (2005) , these were coded together, but since the central focus of this paper is on trade union membership, I take a more cautious approach, and code those in staff associations as nonunion members.
Occupation
The 1998, 2001 and 2004 election surveys use the ASCO2 occupational coding system. Occupation codes for student, not in the labour force, not applicable, inadequately described, and missing are all coded as missing. The occupation 'Other Labourers and Related Workers' is coded inconsistently (93 in 1998; 99 in 2001 and 2004) , so is made consistent in all years.
Weights
Only the 1993 survey is weighted. For all other surveys, each individual is assigned a weight of 1. The weights are then recoded so as to balance the sample across elections, by ensuring that the sum of the weights for each election is 2000.
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